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This paper analyses how aircraft carriers were developed and positioned within US Navy planning for
war in the Pacific during the first decade of the interwar period. Building on Caren Kaplan's framing of
military mobility as a capacity, the paper contends that as carrier technologies advanced during the
1920s so recognition of their capacity to act as more than simply mobile islands tasked with supporting
the big guns of the fleet emerged. The paper draws on a range of primary sources, specifically pertaining
to War Plan Orange (the US's plan for war against Japan primarily developed during the 1920s and
1930s), and analyses US Naval War College documents that positioned carriers, often aspirationally, as
key tools of US Pacific power projection. Inflected through discussion of two US Fleet Problems e naval
exercises which took place in 1924 and 1929 e the paper contends that the emergence of a recognition
that the capabilities of both ship and aircraft needed to be considered in tandem offered new and
important strategic opportunities for US war planners during the interwar period.
© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Mobilisation is defined as active and open preparation for
war…. M-Day is the first day of mobilisation…. M-Day may
precede a declaration of war.1
The Airplane Carrier is distinctively an offensive weapon carrier
and to fulfil this role should; (a) Be capable of projecting
bombing flights in as great strength as possible. (b) Be as mobile
as possible. (c) Possess appropriate defensive capabilities.2
These two quotations encapsulate the concerns of this paper. The
first provides definitions of mobilisation, as set out in the 1929
revision of War Plan Orange, the US Navy's plans for war against
Japan. It clearly illustrates the centrality of the process of mobi-
lisation in the realisation of such a conflict. The second comes from
the US Naval War College in 1926, during a set of discussions
focused on the size, composition and objectives of the US Navy's
future aircraft carriers. It elucidates the core raison d’e^tre ofe, Part I e The Strategic Plan,
ords Administration, College
[hereafter RG] 38, Strategic
5, 83.
riers (letter to the President,
ational Archives and Records
RG 80, General Records of the
, Formerly Secret Correspon-
Ltd. This is an open access articlecarriers: to be mobile and project power. This paper investigates
how the US Navy sought to plan and prepare for conflict across the
Pacific and how aircraft carrier technologies and strategies were
enmeshed in these processes during the first decade of the interwar
period. It foregrounds the classical geopolitical notion of ships as
mobile islands in order to consider how the evolution of US aircraft
carriers, their utilisation in US naval exercises (known as Fleet
Problems), and their role withinWar Plan Orangewere bound up in
their capacities to project US power across the Pacific.3 To do this,
the paper employs a lens for analysis that draws on mobilities
research and geopolitical scholarship to position mobility as a
constellation of complex and often messy capacities to act.4 This
approach enables us to analyse the significance of the carriers'
capability to project power through both sea based and airborne
assets and to understand how this was represented in and through
a range of textual sources and practical exercises.
The paper draws on archival documents pertaining to War Plan
Orange and discussions within the US Navy to enable an under-
standing of how the aircraft carrier was positioned as a tool of US
power projection, and how the perception of what aircraft carriers
offered in terms of mobility developed as technologies advanced3 H.J. Mackinder, The Nations of The Modern World, London, 1911, 133. Also see H.J.
Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, Oxford, 1907.
4 See C. Kaplan, Mobility and war: the cosmic view of US ‘air power’, Environment
and Planning A 38 (2006) 395e397.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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limitations. This material, supported by key secondary sources,
provides significant insight into the development of US planning
for war in the Pacific, and specifically the role and place of aircraft
carriers within those plans.5 In considering the aircraft carrier
components ofWar Plan Orange, and themobility of the carriers, as
represented in both planning documents and in actuality, this pa-
per offers new perspectives on how the US Navy planned to
mobilise its carrier forces to project its power across the Pacific in
the event of war with Japan. This demonstrates how a mobilities
perspective offers new insights into the debates that surrounded
the role and place of carriers in the US Navy during the interwar
period.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews
relevant literature from military mobilities, aerial geopolitics and
the geographies of maritime spaces and ships to provide a concep-
tual framework based on mobility as a capacity to act. The following
three sections analyse how the US Navy, through its plans, reports
and training exercises, sought to understand and develop its aircraft
carrier strategy during the first decade of the interwar period.
These sections consider how the carriers' capacity to mobilise
significant aircraft operations was debated and developed by a
navy predominantly focused on the battleship. Finally, the conclu-
sion returns to the key conceptual ideas that frame this paper to note
the utility of positioning mobility as a capacity to act when inves-
tigating the multiple and intersecting mobilities that influence how
military forces plan for and operate power projection.10 T. Cresswell, Towards a politics of mobility, Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 28 (2010) 17e31.
11 I. Forsyth, On the edges of military mobilities, in: Merriman, Peters, Adey,
Cresswell, Forsyth, and Woodward, Interventions on military mobilities, 49.
12 For more on power projection see A.J. Williams, Flying the flag: Pan AmericanConceptualising the military mobilities of aircraft carriers
As the introduction to this special issue notes, there is a wealth
of scholarship from a number of subject areas that analysesmilitary
movements. Of course, historians and political scientists are
amongst those who have contributed the most to this. Within
contemporary human geography there has been less engagement
with the military and with military mobilities as a subject of
enquiry.6 Those geographical engagements with military mobilities
that have taken place have tended to focus on the embodied mo-
bilities of ‘the patrolling soldier, the flying fighter-jet pilot, [and] the
sailor aboard a ship at sea’.7 Whilst there are a multiplicity of other
mobilities and many ways to make sense of them, I seek to draw
here upon Caren Kaplan's work to define military mobility as a
capacity: a power to, or limitation on the ability to, move military
bodies and materiel across space in order to project state power.8
The conceptualisation of mobility as a capacity to act has been
discussed in other contexts, primarily as something that affects
bodies and spaces. These engagements overlap with Kaplan's work
in recognising that movement is not a flat, linear, universal
endeavour, rather that ‘capacities to move’ are messy, individu-
alised and unique and are spatialized and multi-scalar.9 As such,5 E.S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897e1945,
Annapolis, 1991.
6 For a discussion of some of the reasons for this see M.F. Rech, D. Bos, K.N.
Jenkings, A.J. Williams and R. Woodward, Geography, military geography and crit-
ical military studies, Critical Military Studies 1 (2015) 47e60.
7 R. Woodward and K.N. Jenkings, Soldier, in: P. Adey, D. Bissell, K. Hannam, P.
Merriman and M. Sheller (Eds), The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities, London, 2014,
358.
8 Kaplan, Mobility and war.
9 P. Adey, Mobility, Abingdon, 2010, 165; P. Adey, ‘[T]he frantic and portentous
beating of the wings of the death angels’: intimacy, mobilities and military social
networks, in: P. Merriman, K. Peters, P. Adey, T. Cresswell, I. Forsyth and R.
Woodward, Interventions on military mobilities, Political Geography 56 (2017) 46;
D. Bissell, Vibrating materialities: mobility-body-technology relations, Area 42
(2010) 479e486.this builds on Tim Cresswell's assertion that mobility can be use-
fully construed as a constellation, a concatenation of in-
terrelationships between movement, its representation and its
practices.10 Rather than focusing exclusively on the practices of
movement in relation to the physical motion of aircraft carriers
themselves, this paper considers how the potentiality of military
forces to be deployed, to operate and project state power beyond its
borders can also be identified through a number of US Pacific war
plans and associated US Navy documents. Moreover, it argues that
the particular potentiality of aircraft carriers is recursively inflected
through these, changing across the period considered in important
ways. This approach seeks to ‘reveal the means by which move-
ment is enacted’, and connecting this with geopolitical consider-
ations of how power is projected across space makes it possible to
consider ‘entanglements of movement, power and politics’ in this
context.11 This enables consideration of howmilitary forces prepare
for the possibility of conflict e both in actuality and performatively
through war planning and gaming, the writing and dispersal of
mobilisation schedules, and discussions and reports on the char-
acteristics and construction of new military technologies e and for
the realisation of specific military mobilities in practice.12 To un-
derstand the specific potential and actual mobilities of aircraft
carriers and their aircraft we need to engage with two sets of
literature: those addressing aerial and maritime mobilities.
In recent years the concept of aeromobilities has emerged as a
way of understanding the experiences of being-in-the-air from the
perspective of the civilian air traveller.13 Within this work, signifi-
cant insights have been gleaned by those who have strayed from
civilian air worlds into those inhabited by military aviators and
controlled by military air forces. Engagements with the military
aerial have come from a range of quarters, although most focus on
the centrality of technological capabilities to the achievement and
management of military aerial mobility. Peter Adey's work has been
pivotal in opening up discussion of how pilots' bodies have tradi-
tionally been made ready for aerial work through the use of mili-
tary training methods to physically prepare them for flight.14
Others have questioned the changed modes of movement oper-
ationalised through the use of drone technologies, providing an
insight into how mobilities have become differentiated by the
separation of the constitutive elements of the drone assemblage:Airways and the projection of US power across the interwar Pacific, in F. Mac-
Donald, R. Hughes and K. Dodds (Eds), Observant States: Geopolitics and Visual
Culture, London, 2010, 81e99; A.J. Williams, Hakumat al Tayarrat: the role of air
power in the enforcement of Iraq's borders, Geopolitics 12 (2007) 505e528.
13 S. Cwerner, S. Kesselring and J. Urry (Eds), Aeromobilities, London, 2009; Adey,
Mobility; P. Adey, Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects, Oxford, 2010. See also, P.
Adey, Secured and sorted mobilities: examples from the airport, Surveillance and
Society 1 (2004) 500e519; P. Adey, L. Budd and P. Hubbard, Flying lessons: exploring
the social and cultural geographies of global air travel, Progress in Human Geography
31 (2007) 773e791; L. Amoore, Biometric borders: governing mobilities in the war
on terror, Political Geography 25 (2006) 336e351; L. Budd and P. Adey, The
software-simulated airworld: anticipatory code and affective aeromobilities, Envi-
ronment and Planning A 41 (2009) 1366e1385; L. Millward, The embodied aerial
subject: gendered mobility in British interwar air tours, Journal of Transport History
29 (2008) 5e22.
14 Adey, Aerial Life; P. Adey, ‘Ten thousand lads with shining eyes are dreaming and
their dreams are wings’: affect, airmindedness and the birth of the aerial subject,
Cultural Geographies 18 (2011) 63e89.
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on how bodies become militarised in the course of becoming
aerially mobile in different ways, and how those processes are
different from those that soldiers or sailors might experience.
This paper, however, is concerned with the machines that these
militarised bodies work within and which enable them to perform
their aeromobility: the ship-borne aircraft, and its carrier, and the
plans that underscore the operation of these technologies. Along-
side extensive work by military historians on aerial military strat-
egy and tactics a smaller number of social scientists have written,
albeit mostly indirectly, about aerial military movements at this
scale. For example, in previous work on the use of air power in the
enforcement and maintenance of international boundaries, I have
illustrated how states can seek to limit the capacity to move
through the use of air power to secure these border zones.16
Kaplan's work similarly places and analyses the role of air power
in the creation and maintenance of US defence.17 She notes the
intersections betweenwar andmobility, but also draws attention to
the inconsistencies in these often too linear linkages. Further, she
seeks to dispel the idea that air power is a singular homogenous
entity, illustrating instead how aerial mobilities can be differently
experienced, described and represented. For example, whilst the
threat of air strikes can be argued to affect self governance, this
recedes if not backed up through ‘shows of force’ from aircraft in
the skies.18 Thus, conceptualising aerial mobility as a capacity to act
enables us to connect both its actual performance and its perfor-
mative potentiality in texts which state what it can do and how it
will be done.19 This paper, through a specific focus on aircraft car-
riers, seeks to add further empirical support to these ideas, illus-
trating how the multiplicity of intersecting personal and
technological mobilities that enable aircraft carrier operations have
a geopolitical importance as they relate to capabilities to project
power across oceanic space.20
This relationship between geopolitics and oceanic space was
recognised by classical geopolitical scholars such as Alfred Mahan
and Nicholas Spykman, whose work has been of fundamental
importance to geopolitical understandings of the role and place of
naval power in international relations and conflict.21 In their work
they defined geopolitics as the ability of states to project their
power across space, most specifically into spaces beyond their own
international boundaries. As such, maritime space and the craft
that utilised it were of inherent geopolitical importance. In the first
decade of the twentieth century Halford Mackinder wrote of ships
as mobile islands, and more recent work by Deborah Cowen,
amongst others, has considered the geopolitics of ships.22 Phillip
Steinberg's thesis on the social construction of the ocean also15 D. Gregory, From a view to a kill: drones and late modern warfare, Theory,
Culture and Society 28 (2011) 188e215; A.J. Williams, Enabling persistent presence?
Performing the embodied geopolitics of the unmanned aerial vehicle assemblage,
Political Geography 30 (2011) 381e390.
16 Williams, Hakumat al Tayarrat.
17 Kaplan, Mobility and war.
18 See, D. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919e1939,
Manchester, 1991.
19 A.J. Williams, Reconceptualising spaces of the air: performing the multiple
spatialities of UK military airspaces, Transactions of the Institute of British Geogra-
phers 36 (2011) 253e267.
20 Cresswell, Towards a politics of mobility.
21 See A.T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, London, 1898; N. Spykman,
America's Strategy in World Politics, New York, 1942. Both were contemporary to the
interwar period: Mahan through the influence of his work on US Navy doctrine of
the period and Spykman because his writings were informed by living through this
time.
22 Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas; Mackinder, The Nations of the Modern
World; D. Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade,
Minneapolis, 2014.includes important consideration of military mobilities at sea,
arguing that oceanic space can be mobilised as a military space
through its use by military technologies. Whilst being concerned
with a broad range of human-ocean engagements and entangle-
ments, Steinberg offers an insight into how we can conceptualise
the ocean as a military ‘force-field’.23 The representation of mari-
time space as a three-dimensional theatre of warfare, a physical
space in which conflict occurs, but also a space from, across and
through which the potential of military power can be cast beyond
the immediate physicality of the ship is key when considering the
significance of aircraft carriers and their military mobilities. As will
be illustrated below in discussions of the specifics of US Pacific war
planning, the perceived ability of carrier aviation to extend the
scope of this power projection came to be of key importance in the
development and planned deployment of the US Navy across the
interwar Pacific.
Recent work has also sought to recognise oceanic space as an
assemblage, suggesting the need to acknowledge that maritime
space is not simply a flat plane that can be traversed as if in a state
of suspended animation.24 Rather, oceans and seas have a corpo-
reality, composed of and performed by the multiplicity of bodies
and objects that inhabit and encounter them. Steinberg, writing
with Kimberley Peters, engages with recent work on volume and
verticality, and calls for an engagement with maritime space that
recognises its inherent four-dimensionality, as well as its concur-
rent fixed yet fluid, tangible yet ‘ungraspable’ nature. Their call for a
‘wet ontology’ that recognises the assemblages of materialities,
discourses and practices that make up life within volumetric
oceanic spaces offers a significant way forward, and is especially
useful when considering the perceived role of aircraft carriers.25
This work combined with literatures that focus upon the geogra-
phies of the ship enables us to move beyond homogenised notions
of the ‘ship’ and the ‘sea’ to unpick and illuminate the multiple,
complex, and sometimes competing, geographies of ships in seas.26
Recognising that every ship has a unique spatiality, and thus ca-
pacity to act, both within its hull and through the movement of
those inhabited hulls through maritime space, these authors have
added much depth and detail to our understandings of these ves-
sels and their activities. Much of this literature has focused on the
ships used to transport African slaves to the Americas and the ef-
fects of this trade.27 Other work has focused on the mobilities of
container ships, and those that, in a variety of guises, seek to use
maritime spaces for illegal reasons.28 However, little work within
contemporary human geography has explicitly engaged with naval23 P. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean, London, 2001, 17 footnote 10.
24 P. Steinberg, Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions,
Atlantic Studies: Global Currents 10 (2013) 156e159.
25 P. Steinberg and K. Peters, Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: giving depth to volume
through oceanic thinking, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33 (2015)
252.
26 See A. Anim-Addo, W. Hasty and K. Peters, The mobilities of ships and shipped
mobilities, Mobilities 9 (2014) 337e349; W. Hasty and K. Peters, The ship in geog-
raphy and the geographies of ships, Geography Compass 6 (2012) 660e676; K. Pe-
ters, Tracking (im)mobilities at sea: ships, boats and surveillance strategies,
Mobilities 9 (2014) 414e431.
27 See, for example, D. Featherstone, Atlantic networks, antagonisms and the
formation of subaltern political identities, Social and Cultural Geography 6 (2005)
387e404. Featherstone's paper draws upon P. Linebaugh, and M. Rediker, The Many-
Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves and Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revo-
lutionary Atlantic, London, 2000. See also M. Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human
History, London, 2007.
28 Peters, Tracking (im)mobilities at sea; D. Cowen, Containing insecurity: US port
cities and the ‘war on terror’ in: S. Graham (Ed.), Disrupted Cities: When Infra-
structure Fails, London, 2009, 69e84.
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This matters for two reasons. Firstly, and most obviously,
limiting ourselves to studies of civilian or commercial shipping
risks overlooking a sizeable number of the ships that utilise
maritime spaces. Secondly, and more importantly, this oversight
leads us to fail to recognise the fundamental differences between
the purposes of mobility for commercial and military shipping.
Unlike commercial shipping, whose key aim is to move across
the oceans between two land termini e remaining intrinsically
linked to the littoral spaces of ports and harbours to fulfil
their raison d’e^tre e the aim and objective of military vessels is
to remain at sea, enacting a geopolitical force-field. Naval
power projection is enabled and maintained fundamentally
through the deployment of ships at sea and their movements
within maritime space. Ships in port are far less effective, in a
similar way to aircraft on the ground or, in the case of aircraft
carriers, on the flight deck.30 Work on maritime mobilities that
focuses on commercial shipping is, therefore, only of limited use
when trying to understand the specific mobilities of naval
technologies.
Taking these literatures together, and noting their limitations,
illustrates that consideration of the mobilities of aircraft carriers
offers a way to begin to consider the specific implications of naval
power projection for understandings of military mobilities and the
geographies of ships. As Adey has illustrated, thinking aerially
requires us to consider how the ground and the air, the horizontal
and the vertical, are intertwined and mutually constructed.31 Thus,
through an analysis of the relevant planning and discussion doc-
uments, as well as key naval exercises which relate to the use of
US aircraft carriers in the Pacific between 1919 and 1929, the
following sections will illustrate that we not only need to recog-
nise that naval ships have different geographies to commercial
shipping, but also that aircraft carriers have fundamentally
different potential mobile capacities and capabilities to other craft,
analysis of which offers a different understanding of what mari-
time military mobilities are perceived to look like and what out-
comes they enable.Placing the US Navy in the interwar Pacific
During the first years of the twentieth century relations be-
tween the US, UK, China and Japan were predominantly cordial,
although these outward shows of conviviality did not prevent the
US Navy beginning to consider the practicalities of a Pacific con-
flict.32 And, whilst the Japanese had begun to flex their developing
military muscles with defeat of the Russian fleet in 1905, the US
continued to maintain good relations with Japan until the First
World War.33 In the aftermath of the war, however, Japan's
continuing good relations with the UK raised concerns in Wash-
ington. In addition, the granting of the League of Nations' mandate
over former German island territories in the western Pacific to
Japan, which effectively cut the US Navy's ability to steam directly29 See F. MacDonald, The last outpost of empire: Rockall and the cold war, Journal
of Historical Geography 32 (2006) 627e647; A. Davies, Identity and the assemblages
of protest: the spatial politics of the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, 1946, Geoforum 48
(2013) 24e32; A.D. Davies, Learning ‘large ideas’ overseas: discipline, (im)mobility
and political lives in the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, Mobilities 9 (2014) 384e400.
30 See Williams, Hakumat al Tayarrat, 507e510.
31 Adey, Aerial Life, 2.
32 See H. Wray, Japanese-American relations and perceptions, 1900e1940, in: H.
Conroy and H. Wray (Eds), Pearl Harbor Re-Examined: Prologue to the Pacific War,
Hawaii, 1990, 1e16; A.W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, New
Haven, 1938.
33 Wray, Japanese-American relations and perceptions, 5.from Hawaii to its outposts in the Philippines, caused tensions to
emerge between the US and Japan.34
In 1918 the US Navy General Board proposed a significant
building plan that would strengthen the battle fleet across the re-
gion, and by 1921 the navy had repositioned its main fleet from the
Atlantic to the Pacific with ten battleships stationed off the west
coast.35 Early post-war Pacific war planning focused on the po-
tential for a battleship campaign, based not only on dominant US
naval doctrine of the period, as inspired by Mahan's work, but also
grounded in the technological realities of a big gun focused,
battleship-led fleet.36 For instance, the Office of Naval Operations
began drawing up plans for a number of ‘impregnable safe havens’,
island bases at Pearl Harbor, Guam and in the Philippines that the
US Navy could use as way-stations for its battleships to enable them
to project US power across the Pacific. However, almost immedi-
ately the navy was stymied first by congress, who refused to fund
its building programme, and then by the election of a new presi-
dent, Warren Harding, whose aim was to drive global arms limi-
tation.37 Indeed, whilst recognising that military strategy and
government foreign policies are not shaped in a vacuum, the US
Navy's position in the Pacific during the first decade of the interwar
period is significant in that it was predominantly shaped through
the anti-militarism ideals of the president, the return of congress to
a relatively isolationist stance, and the fight against this by the US
military. The US Navy's recognition of, and reaction to, British and
Japanese military activities was largely ignored by the US govern-
ment for much of the period in question, and thus the US Navy's
capacity to act was unable to meet its desire to project its power
and prepare for conflict.
The Washington Naval Conference of 1921e1922 illustrates this
point. The key treaty signed there laid down a 5:5:3 ratio for US, UK
and Japanese capital ship construction.38 It also set limitations on
the numbers and tonnages for a range of naval ship classes, in effect
constraining the size of the naval fleets of the US, UK, France, Italy
and Japan, and halting battleship and battlecruiser construction.
Whilst numerically the treaty still favoured the US in the Pacific,
once distance calculations and the limitedmobility of a long supply
train and its impact on the capabilities of the fleet were taken into
account, the treaty gave Japan the capacity to become a significant
regional power in the western Pacific. The 1922 treaty also pre-
vented the US from being able to build any new naval bases
(including naval air bases) on its island possessions west of Hawaii
(see Fig. 1).
Since land-based long range bombers, such as the US's Curtiss B-
2 Condor, had an operating radius of approximately seven hundred
nautical miles these treaty stipulations effectively put any naval
operation more than three hundred and fifty miles west of Hawaii
beyond the range of land-based aircraft.39 These limits thus
restricted the US Navy's capacity to project power in three-
dimensions in the western Pacific to carrier aircraft only. Howev-
er, the US congress was unsupportive of repeated requests for funds
to build the navy to the levels defined by the treaty. As Edward
Miller's seminal work on War Plan Orange acknowledges, in the
event of conflict it was recognised that ‘Japan would seize the34 G.W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy 1890e1990, Stanford,
1993.
35 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 83 and 91.
36 N. Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, Annapolis, 1983.
See Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power.
37 See Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 92e93.
38 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 99e100. For more on the details of the
Washington treaty see http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/nav_lim.html, last
accessed October 2015.
39 P.M. Bowers, Curtiss Aircraft 1907e1947, London, 1979, 215.
Fig. 1. Key US island possessions across the Pacific. Map drawn by John Garner, University of Hull, 2005.
A.J. Williams / Journal of Historical Geography 58 (2017) 71e81 75lightly defended American outposts’ of Guam and the Philippines,
and the US Navy ‘would be unable to prevent these takeovers’.40
Thus, in spite of Japan's growing militarism and active naval con-
struction to meet its treaty limits, an increasingly isolationist and
anti-military US government meant that the US Navy's position in
the Pacific became increasingly challenging during the interwar
period.4140 Miller, War Plan Orange, 4.
41 W. Moffatt, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, The influences of developments
in naval aviation on the development of the art and material of naval warfare, 31st
July 1928, NARA DC, RG 80. General Records, Navy Dept. Formerly Secret Corre-
spondence, 1927e1939, Box 253.Early post-war Orange planning and carriers as mobile islands
In the US in the early post-war period the aircraft carrier was
predominantly considered a support vessel for the battleship fleet.
As Craig Felker notes, US Navy Board hearings in January 1919
agreed that naval aviation needed to be deployed beyond existing
land bases to provide scouting duties for the fleet, and as such
needed to be ship-borne.42 However, whilst naval aviation was
recognised as having a ship-based role, many argued that the US
Navy could utilise small numbers of floatplanes that could be car-
ried on and launched by a variety of ship types, such as cruisers or
tenders, rather than requiring purpose built carriers and aircraft. As42 C.C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: US Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923e1940,
College Station, Texas, 2007.
A.J. Williams / Journal of Historical Geography 58 (2017) 71e8176such, for several years after the First World War, the US perceived
aircraft carriers to be of secondary importance, to be utilised as
generic mobile islands. They were little more than ‘depot ship[s]’
that could offer support and maintenance for floatplanes, and
resupply facilities for other ships within the fleet, rather than
offensive weapons that could enable new forms of maritime
mobility. Their aircraft were predominantly tasked with ‘recon-
naissance and artillery spotting’ duties for the battle fleet ‘and the
denial of these advantages to an enemy’. Much of this resulted from
the predominance of Mahanian gun battle advocates within the
upper echelons of the US Navy, leading to a failure to develop
carrier technologies to the same extent as the US's rivals. Together
with the limitations of the Washington treaties and an unsuppor-
tive congress, these dominant perceptions resulted in the US hav-
ing only one carrier for much of the 1920s, the USS Langley, which
was a converted collier with poor speed, limited aircraft handling
and little if any offensive capabilities.43
The Langley entered service in 1922 and was initially converted
to be able to carry nine aircraft. This was later expanded to a
complement of twelve fighter and twelve spotter aircraft.44 Its
launch and recovery operations were so constricted that it took
twelve minutes to recover a plane and clear the flight deck.45 It had
a maximum speed of fifteen knots and a range of 3500 nautical
miles.46 As Friedman notes, the Langley ‘was never more than an
experimental carrier, unable to keep up even with battleships,
let alone operate with fast scouting forces’.47 As such, the Langley's
capacity to act as part of the battle fleet was severely limited, and a
gap emerged between what it was realistically possible to achieve
andwhatwas desired in terms of carrier operations and strategy for
fighting a Pacific war. Elements in the US Naval War College and
naval aviation supporters within the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics
and War Plans Division advocated for an Orange war plan that
placed multiple carriers within the fleet. However, the Mahanian
dominated General Board and battle fleet hierarchy continued to
position naval aviation as a support to ‘gun ship’ operations. The
power of this ‘big gun’ element within the navy meant that the
Langley was the only carrier deployed for five years, and its sig-
nificant aerial and maritime mobility limitations consequently
limited the development of carrier air strategy within the US
Navy.48
In spite of the US government's reluctance to act offensively in
terms of naval construction or deployment, the army and navy
continued to develop plans for war against Japan. By 1923 work on
War Plan Orange had begun to coalesce with a set of clear strategic
objectives emerging. The Basic War Plan, published in June 1923
and known as WPL-8 in the navy's planning nomenclature,
responded to the fleet's repositioning in the Pacific and the limi-
tations of the Washington treaties, setting out detailed strategic
and operational plans for war across the Pacific. At the core of this
plan, and the various documents which encompass its strategic,43 Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, 7, 9, 35e36.
44 Compare this with the USS Lexington which was launched in 1927 and could
carry a complement of eighteen fighters, eighteen bombers, twenty scouts and
eighteen torpedo bombers. See Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, 389e390.
45 See Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, 36 and N. Friedman, Fighters over the Fleet:
Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War, Barnsley, 2016, 32.
46 T. Wildenberg, Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of
Carrier Airpower, Annapolis, 1998, 48. Again compare this to the USS Lexington
which reached speeds of thirty-four knots in sea trials with a range of over ten
thousand miles. See Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, 390.
47 Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, 37.
48 For information on the role and aims of the Bureau of Aeronautics, see T. Hone,
N. Friedman and M. Mendeles, Innovation in Carrier Aviation, Naval War College,
Newport Papers, Newport, Rhode Island, 2011. See also Felker, Testing American Sea
Power, 47.readiness and operating plans for conflict with Japan, are the
mobilisation schedules, from which the first quotation at the
beginning of this paper comes. Analysis of how these mobilisation
plans developed during the various iterations of the Orange plans,
as undertaken by Miller, provides an insight into how a range of
political and practical considerations formed a constellation of ca-
pacities and limitations to act.49
The first volume of WPL-8 set out ‘the conditions of readiness
for war to be attained and maintained in peace’.50 In other words it
was a plan that would enable the fleet to be mobilised should war
be declared. It stipulated that this would be accomplished by
a movement from Hawaiian Islands to Manila Bay, to begin 14
days after zero [M] day, by a force of active units at least 25%
superior to the total Japanese naval strength, accompanied by
50,000 Army troops; and a subsequent westward supporting
movement by the remainder of the US Fleet from the Hawaiian
Islands, not later than 60 days after zero [M] day.51
A subsequent memorandum to the Joint Army and Navy Board in
1924 provided the geographical extent of the theatre inwhich these
mobilisations would take place: ‘[t]he area west of one hundred
and forty (140) degrees west longitude, and east of one hundred
(100) degrees east longitude’ (see Fig. 1).52 The 1923 iteration of
WPL-8 details that, in the event of this mobilisation, the aviation
component of the Pacific Battle Fleet would consist of the flagship,
USS Langley, accompanied by its tender, USS Gannet.53 Given the
limitations of the Langley in terms of its speed, operating radius and
aviation complement, it is clear that the 1923 version of War Plan
Orange offered an unrealistic expectation of what an aircraft carrier
could provide to the fleet in terms of either defensive or offensive
mobile capabilities.
In addition to the realities of the ships available and the ideals of
the war planners, preparations for war in the Pacific had a third
axis, as the US Navy undertook training exercises, known as Fleet
Problems, at least once a year. Developed to enable possible tactics
and technological advances to be tested under operational condi-
tions, and in an attempt to mitigate the limitations of deployment
forced upon the navy by the Washington treaties, these Fleet
Problems played a significant role in the complex and messy evo-
lution of the role of carriers within the Orange plans. The Langley
was first deployed as part of these exercises in Fleet Problem Four in
January 1924, and its role illustrates the positioning of carrier
aviation within US war planning of the period. For most of the
exercise the Langley's small complement of aircraft undertook
scouting duties for the battleships' guns. They were not tasked with
seeking out enemy aircraft, nor with acting offensively, until the
very end of the exercise when forced to react to an attack on the
fleet by the ‘enemy's’ land-based air force. This engagement
effectively proved the Langley's role as a mobile island, with its
aircraft operating as any shore-based defensive naval aviation unit
would to defend their base against attack.54
Arguably, this tactic was advanced in part by the dominance of
the Mahanian battleship cohort within the US Navy, but the impact
of the Washington treaty's limitations on the construction of49 Miller, War Plan Orange.
50 Department of the Navy, Basic Readiness Plan, 25th June 1923, NARA CP, RG 38,
Strategic Plans, War Plans Division, WPL Series, WPL-8, Box 7, 13.
51 Department of the Navy, Basic Readiness Plan, 25th June 1923, NARA CP, RG 38,
Box 7, 18.
52 Joint Planning Committee, February 1924, Memorandum to the Joint Board,
NARA CP, RG. 165. WPO. Box 268.
53 Department of the Navy, Basic Readiness Plan, 25th June 1923, NARA CP, RG 38,
Box 7, Appendix B, 3.
54 Felker Testing American Sea Power, 42e43.
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Department's Special Board on Shore Establishments (known as the
Rodman Board), which had reported a year before Fleet Problem
Four, reinforced the notion that the navy could offset the limits of
theWashington treaty through the use of carrier aviation by stating
that ‘The mission of naval aircraft is as follows: Operations from
mobile floating bases or from naval air stations on shore (a) As an
arm of the fleet (b) For overseas scouting’.55 In Fleet Problem Four
this was exactly how the Langley was mobilised. And so the
emergence of carrier operations within the US battle fleet in 1924
can be clearly linked to concerns about how to replace the capacity
to build and utilise island airfields in any future Pacific conflict.
This illustrates the messiness of the development of the US Navy
aircraft carriers' capacity to act, and the range of overlapping and
opposing constituencies that influenced this. Whilst some scholars
point to Fleet Problem Four as a key point in carrier development,
when considered through a geopolitical mobility lens, and in con-
cert with the Rodman Board's definitions, it becomes clear that
whilst the Langley acted as a mobile island (or floating base as
Rodman describes), able to launch and recover aircraft to defend its
position, it did little offensively. In addition, contemporary com-
mentators noted the Langley's inability to launch and recover
aircraft in anything other than calm seas during daylight.56 Thus,
whilst Fleet Problem Four may have idealistically indicated the
potential of carrier aviation, in reality the Langley operated as little
more than an artificial island. Its speed limitations, in comparison
to the fleet's capital ships, and its aircraft's operating tactics
ensured that it was most effective when fixed in one location with
calm sea conditions. Furthermore, following Steinberg and Peters'
call for us to be attendant to the maritime environment and its
capacity to affect movement, we can see how the movement of the
waves diminished the Langley's ability to operate in strong seas and
thus impacted upon its ability to project US power in certain sea
conditions. This exemplifies the utility of developing a critique
based onmobility as a capacity to act as it enables us to analyse how
a variety of factors could enable and limit the functionality of US
aircraft carriers during this period.57 As such, we can see that the
Langley offered little capacity to be truly mobile or reactive to
changing maritime, atmospheric or tactical requirements.
The emergence of carrier mobility and Fleet Problem Nine
It was not until the next two converted carriers, the USS Lex-
ington and USS Saratoga, entered the fleet that the carrier began to
be perceived as more than simply a mobile island (see Fig. 2).58 The
enhanced capabilities of these two carriers, in concert with emer-
gent debates at the US Naval War College on future carrier char-
acteristics and tactics that were realised in exercises, illustrated the
capacity of aircraft carriers to act as independent offensiveweapons
within the US fleet. When the Lexington and Saratoga entered ser-
vice in 1927 and 1928 respectively they enabled a significant
advance for the US Navy in terms of its capacity to project power.
The USS Saratoga, for example, had originally been designed as a
battlecruiser but was converted to a carrier part way through
construction as a result of theWashington treaty limits. Designed to
provide a maximum aviation complement of seventy aircraft,55 H. Rodman, Report of the Special Board on Shore Establishments, Navy
Department, 12th January 1923, NARA DC, RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, Shore
Stations Development Board, Box 15, 1586.
56 US Navy, Report on US Navy Fleet Problem Number Four, as noted in Felker,
Testing American Sea Power, 43.
57 Steinberg and Peters, Wet ontologies.
58 The photograph in Fig. 2 is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:US_carriers_Bremerton_1929.jpg, last accessed July 2017.including fighters, bombers and scout planes, the Saratoga enabled
the US Navy to begin to close the gap between the aims of War Plan
Orange and the realities of what the navy could put to sea. The ship
had a maximum range of ten thousand miles and a top speed of
thirty knots, thus it could sail with and manoeuvre as part of the
battleship fleet.59 Coupled with that, by the outbreak of the Second
World War, the aircraft carried aboard the Saratoga included the
Grumman Avenger torpedo bomber, which had an operational
range of a thousandmiles and a top speed of 275mph. The Saratoga
was able, through dint of its improved technical capabilities, to
offset the impact of wind speed and direction, and wave height,
which had so significantly limited themobility of the Langley. These
intersecting ship and aircraft ranges, speeds and capabilities gave
the Saratoga a significant element of dynamic mobility, enabling
the navy to project US power across a significant swathe of the
Pacific through the presence, or threat of the presence, of both the
carriers and their aircraft.60
Acknowledging the agency of the sea within aircraft carrier
operations enables us to consider the ways in which the material-
ities of wave height, movement and wind speed intersected with
the capacities of these ships. Their ability to act as part of the fleet
was not only related to their cruising speed and range, but also the
fluid and changing environment in which they were deployed. The
capabilities of the Lexington and the Saratoga exceeded those of the
Langley through physical differences in hull size and advances in
the technologies of the aircraft they carried. These worked within a
messy and dynamic assemblage of sea, air, wind, ship, discussion
papers, strategic plans, deployment tactics and human capabilities
to produce a more effective capacity to act. Here, then, we can see
how a complex assemblage of materials and discourses combined
to enable a more capable aircraft carrier type to emerge.
Although neither the Lexington nor the Saratoga were built as
carriers from the keel up, it is clear from US Naval War College and
Bureau of Aeronautics documents from the second half of the 1920s
that their construction, and the Langley's deployment in fleet
problems, continued to spur debate within the naval establishment
as to the role and scope of carriers and their air wings.61 This can be
illustrated through analysis of a set of documents outlining aircraft
carrier characteristics produced by the college during 1926 and
1927. As the second quotation at the start of this paper illustrates,
the NavalWar Collegewas one of the key places inwhich discussion
about what carriers could provide for the US fleet was undertaken.
Speed was quickly identified in a 1926 report by Commander R.R.
Stewart as ‘an essential quality in both the carrier and the plane’
with a recognition that ‘the faster the carrier and the greater the
cruising radius the better’.62 Here, then, mobility was defined as the
capacity to move as quickly as possible and for as long as possible,
providing the defensive capability to outrun enemy craft and
weaponry, and the offensive capacity to attack targets at a distance.
Stewart's colleague, Captain J.W. Greenslade, commented, just
months after Stewart, that the US Navy should advance a policy of
building ‘the maximum number of smaller carriers obtainable from
the allotted tonnage’ as stipulated under the 1922 treaty regula-
tions.63 His reasoning centred on the perceived capacity for carriers
to move in particular ways, stating that a fleet of smaller carriers
would increase the ‘mobility of [the Navy's] air force as far as carrier59 Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers.
60 B. Tillman, Avenger at War, London, 1979.
61 Felker, Testing American Sea Power, 48e50.
62 Stewart, Airplane Carriers, 10th June 1926, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 2e3.
63 Capt. J.W. Greenslade, Memorandum regarding characteristic of carriers, 12th
November 1926, NARA DC, RG 80, General Records of the Dept of the Navy, Office of
the Secretary of the Navy, Formerly Secret Correspondence 1927e1939, Box 253, 2.
Fig. 2. The USS Lexington (top), USS Saratoga (middle) and USS Langley (bottom) docked in Bremerton, Washington in 1929. Source: U.S. Navy, National Museum of Naval Aviation
photo No. 1996.488.001.004.
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put planes in the air more rapidly and consequently to concentrate
them for attack or defense’.64 Thus, Greenslade positioned carrier
mobility as three-dimensional and identified that carrier mobility
could be related to one or other or both of its component elements:
movement at sea and in the air.
Both of these assessments are illustrative of a debate within
naval circles during this period relating to how best to utilise the
tonnage limits dictated to the US Navy by the Washington treaty.
These focused on whether a small number of large carriers or a
large number of small carriers would offer the best options for
Pacific power projection. In a memorandum from October 1926 the
advantages and disadvantages of the many smaller carriers option
are played out, with conclusions reaffirming that ‘a larger number
of small carriers is to be preferred to a smaller number of large
carriers’ and that these ‘carriers should be of very high speed’.65
Although not using these terms, this debate was concerned with
how the US Navy would develop its capacity to act within this
potential theatre of conflict. It is also illustrative of the gap between64 Greenslade, Memorandum regarding characteristic of carriers, 12th November
1926, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 2.
65 Anon, Memorandum regarding characteristics of carriers, 25th October 1926,
NARA DC, RG 80, General Records of the Dept of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, Formerly Secret Correspondence 1927e1939, Box 253, 4 and 6.the capabilities of the ships afloat (and even those under con-
struction) and the performative potentialities writ large in War
Plan Orange and Naval War College discussion documents. This
debate provides significant insight into how naval decision-making
circles positioned carrier mobility at the time.
The three-dimensionality of carrier operations was also recog-
nised, with Greenslade discussing the need for different types of
aircraft to provide different operational capabilities rather than the
dimensions of the carrier dictating the composition of its air wing.
Fighter planes were needed to secure the airspace around the fleet
and observation-bombers were necessary to enable the gun ships
to operate effectively and to provide additional air-to-ship attack
capabilities.66 As such, these reports recognised the need for car-
riers to be deployed with a number of different types of aircraft
aboard, offering the capacity to engage in a variety of different
conflictual spatialities. However, this also limited the mobility of
these ships through their need to attend to the differing re-
quirements of the small, fast, fighters and the larger more
cumbersome bombers. Thus, in noting that ‘Carriers should be so
constructed as to carry various types of planes rather than one type
only’ the commentators of the NavalWar College in the latter half of66 Greenslade, Memorandum regarding characteristic of carriers, 12th November
1926, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 4e5.
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carriers.67
This can be seen most significantly in the final document of this
series, from April 1927, in which the president of the Naval War
College, Rear Admiral William V. Pratt summarised the preceding
documents and provided conclusions to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions on his preferred size, speed and aviation complement for the
US Navy's future carrier force. Looking to a point beyond the
experimental Langley to a time when keel-up carriers would
become the norm, and the US Navy was no longer hamstrung by
carriers converted from other ship types, Pratt offered a set of five
carrier and aircraft characteristics he deemed most pertinent to the
US Navy's needs.68 Fundamental to this were the mobility related
elements raised by Stewart and Greenslade: the size and speed of
the carrier, and the characteristics of its air wing, to which Pratt
added the ship's protection and armament. In addition, Pratt
argued that the vast distances between land-based airfields, that
would be a key feature of any Pacific war, precipitated the need to
consider how aircraft carriers would be required to act.69
Pratt's report is significant in that it illustrates his informed
perspective on both the capacity and limitations of carriers' po-
tentialities during this period and indicates the messiness that
geography brings to this consideration. It also speaks to the debates
discussed above about whether a small number of large fleet car-
riers or a fleet of smaller carriers was more useful. These are
indicative of the centrality of mobility as a set of capacities to do a
multiplicity of things, possibly simultaneously. Pratt noted that the
fleet of smaller carriers option had
strong arguments in its support, such as mobility and flexibility
for various tasks, greater scouting area, security (due to more
ships) both in regard to number of decks left after a hostile
attack and better chance of planes being recovered, mutual
support… and last but not least the larger number of planes put
afloat.70
He argued that this formulation ‘cannot be too strongly emphas-
ised’ in relation to the development of tactics for fighting a long
range naval campaign because in order for the US Navy ‘to advance
into a hostile zone the fleet must carry with it an air force that will
ensure, beyond a doubt, command of the air’.71 Pratt's report clearly
illustrates that those tasked with considering the potentialities of
carriers were definitively moving away from the mobile island/
depot ship premise of the Langley towards something much more
dynamic, three-dimensional and offensively enabled. The effect of
this evolution of opinion on the possible role and functions of
carriers and their capacity to act is best illustrated through two
further examples: first, a report written by Rear Admiral William
Moffett, the chief of the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics in 1928; and,
second, Fleet Problem Nine, which took place in 1929.
Moffett was an advocate of naval aviation, arguing that the
aeroplane was a naval weapon and as such its utility to the fleet
needed to be proved to those who continued to favour the battle-
ship.72 Moffett's role in advocating for carrier aviation was partic-
ularly significant, as he sought to position it within the US Navy67 Anon, Memorandum regarding characteristics of carriers, 25th October 1926,
NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 2.
68 W.M. Pratt, Airplane Carriers, 11th April 1927, NARA DC, RG 80, General Records
of the Dept of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Formerly Secret Cor-
respondence 1927e1939, Box 253.
69 Pratt, Airplane Carriers, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 3e4.
70 Pratt, Airplane Carriers, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 2.
71 Pratt, Airplane Carriers, NARA DC, RG 80, Box 253, 2.
72 Felker, Testing American Sea Power, 41; see also W.F. Trimble, Admiral William A.
Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation, Washington, 1994.rather than being independent of it. This positioned carriers as
having a double mobility. Their aerial operating capabilities were
understood as entwined within, not additional to, the maritime
operating capacities of the fleet inwhich theywere deployed as had
been the case when the Langley fulfilled the mobile island ideal of
the ‘big gun’ supporters. As such the mobility of carrier-borne
aircraft emerged as something significantly different to their land
or sea based peers, in that they were not simply flown from a fixed
point to complete a mission and then return. Instead they were
launched from amoving platform that changed its position in terms
of its locationwithin the fleet and the theatre of operations. Moffett
illustrated these connections by requiring naval aviators to think of
themselves as naval officers first and aviators second, indicating
that their primary focus should be with the fleet and how their
aviation capabilities could support it. As such, Moffett's concern
was to advocate for carriers that could operate as much more than
simply mobile support and aircraft depot ships. Instead, he saw
them as tools that would be part of the fleet's offensive capabil-
ities.73 This perspective can be seen in the report he produced for
the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations in
August 1928, entitled ‘The Influences of Developments in Naval
Aviation on the Development of the Art and Material of Naval
Warfare’.74
Moffett's report offered his perspective on the role and place of
carriers and their aircraft within US Navy operations and sets out
his vision for how they could provide defensive and offensive op-
portunities that would enable the fleet to be successful in conflict
and thus how they should be positioned inWar Plan Orange. Key to
this was his recognition that carrier aircraft have multiple tasks to
fulfil, thus requiring a multiplicity of carrier tactics to be developed
rather than operating in just one role. This is elucidated in his
comments about the use of carrier aircraft in spotting targets for
the battleships' guns. He noted that:
in order to enable battleship observation planes properly to
execute their mission, it is absolutely essential that one carrier
deck be available near the battle line for the specific purpose of
reservicing these planes, of providing replacements and of
basing protective fighters.
He further argued that:
If the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA are to fulfil theirmissions as at
present conceived, they will have full need of all their aircraft
and deck area for other operations. Also their legitimate oper-
ations may call for their presence in an area too far distant to
serve battle line planes.75
Here, then, following Pratt's comments, is the development of a
much more complex idea of carrier mobilities than previous de-
bates over the size and number of carriers had considered. Moffett
advocated not only for more carriers but for a multiplicity of carrier
roles that would influence the size and composition of their air
wings, and from that their role in War Plan Orange and US power
projection. In subsequent paragraphs of his report Moffett set out
additional carrier aviation roles, including the use of bombers to
provide a threat to submarines and thus support convoy opera-
tions, the use of fighters to accompany bombers tasked with
attacking ‘enemy coastal defense guns’, and the use of aircraft ‘to
spot naval gunfire, to drive off enemy bombers, to attack shore73 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 140e142.
74 Moffett, The influences of developments in naval aviation, NARA DC, RG 80, Box
253.
75 Moffett, The influences of developments in naval aviation, NARA DC, RG 80, Box
253, 7.
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and to spot temporarily for army gunfire’ during the seizure and
defence of beach heads.76 This list of potential carrier aviation tasks
drew heavily upon tactics from the Orange Plans but, unlike those
documents, it set out the requirements for a range of carrier types
to enable these tasks to be accomplished. Moffett thus redefined
the understanding of maritime space as a military force-field,
perceiving the carrier's area of operations as a three-dimensional
volume in which a whole range of offensive and defensive tasks
could be undertaken. Through this document, Moffett built on
Pratt's earlier assessment to bridge the gap from the positioning of
carriers as mobile islands serving the fleet through defensive and
support functions to needing to provide a multiplicity of carriers
and aircraft to conduct a range of tasks that offered strategic and
spatial dynamism. Indeed, he concluded that ‘the advent of aircraft
as practical weapons of ships in actual every day operations of
today is leading to important changes in ship characteristics, in
naval tactics and in our entire tactical concept of offensive opera-
tions at sea’.77
Whilst Moffett was clearly a naval aviation advocate and had a
vision of how carriers could evolve fleet operations, perhaps the
most significant event in shaping how their capacity to act was
understood during this period came a few months after his report
was published. Fleet Problem Nine, which ran during January 1929,
provided, for the first time, both participating fleets with access to
viable aircraft carriers as the Lexington and Saratoga were both
deployed. Additionally, and significantly, one of the fleets operated
their carrier, the Saratoga, independently to the fleet, tasking it with
an aerial operation on the enemy's main strategic land base rather
than slaving it to provide air cover and scouting for the battle fleet's
guns. Whilst successful, counter attacks by the Lexington's aircraft
on the Saratoga's fleet highlighted the need to be able to split a
carrier's aircraft to provide both offensive and defensive tasks
simultaneously as Moffett had outlined. In spite of this vulnera-
bility, most commentators concurred that operating the Saratoga in
a much more dynamic way than previously trialled was a signifi-
cant strategic advancement. The successes of the Lexington and
Saratoga in Fleet Problem Nine provided a challenge to existing
naval doctrine as 'Mahanian maxims [proved] increasingly tenuous
when tested against weapons operating in three dimensions'.78
Following a review of the exercise, the commander of the navy's
Air Battle Fleet, Rear Admiral Reeves, advocated for the deployment
of carriers independent of the main fleet with their own mobile
screening force to mitigate the vulnerability of steaming without
the perceived protection of the fleet's big guns.79
With Moffett's report and the outcome of Fleet Problem Nine,
for the first time the unique capacities of carrier mobility were
beginning to be fully recognised and strategic planning began to
move to meet the carriers' potential rather than expecting them to
fit within previously composed plans.80 Whilst the unusual
deployment of the Saratoga during Fleet Problem Nine had offered
the opportunity to reconsider the most fruitful way to mobilise
carriers, the advances in aircraft technologies and the size advan-
tages the Saratoga and Lexington had over the Langley (until then
the only other carrier deployed during such exercises) were also
important. As Wildenberg notes, the size and weight constraints76 Moffett, The influences of developments in naval aviation, NARA DC, RG 80, Box
253, 8e9.
77 Moffett, The influences of developments in naval aviation, NARA DC, RG 80, Box
253, 14.
78 Felker, Testing American Sea Power, 51.
79 Wildenberg, Destined for Glory.
80 Felker, Testing American Sea Power, 50.imposed on carrier aircraft had produced some significant engi-
neering developments. Army aircraft launched from land bases
during Fleet Problem Nine were heavier, slower and less agile than
their carrier-borne competitors which quickly outmanoeuvred
their opponents thanks to lighter and more efficient engines.81
Thus, through this exercise, the carriers' capacity to act was real-
ised through three-dimensional mobilities that, through the novel
deployment strategy employed by the Saratoga and its carrier
configured aircraft, began to indicate the utility of the aircraft car-
rier as a tool with a volumetric mobility.82
Conclusions
Fleet Problem Nine probably raised as many questions and un-
certainties as it answered, and deliberations along the lines of those
illustrated above continued to affect the development of carrier
design decisions, such that the US Navy remained largely battleship
fleet focused well into the 1930s. Whilst the numbers of advocates
of carrier aviation grew, and the deployment of carriers inWar Plan
Orange and further Fleet Problems enabled their potential capac-
ities to act to be further tested, the US remained behind its Pacific
rivals in the development of a viable and useful carrier fleet that
could project its power across the region. However, as this paper
has shown, work by a number of key figures combined with the
aims of the war planners and the evidence brought by the Fleet
Problems combined to effect changes in how the US Navy's aircraft
carriers were perceived and utilised to project power across the
Pacific and prepare for war with Japan.
This paper has sought to build upon Caren Kaplan's notion of
military mobility as a capacity to analyse how these mobilities can
be usefully considered as capacities to act, arguing that this
approach enables us to consider not only the specific movements of
military personnel and materiel but also requires us to look behind
those end points into the complex and messy processes through
which decisions are made that influence how those eventual
movements are shaped and formed. Significantly, in terms of con-
siderations of military mobilities it enables us to analyse the stra-
tegic plans for movement that military forces make, the debates
and discussions that frame those, and the technological possibil-
ities and limitations that influence these and how they are tested.
Importantly, thinking about military mobility as a capacity to act
requires us to think not only about all these factors but also about
the gaps between those plans and ideas and the realities of what
military forces can (and cannot) do. As such, it requires us to
conceptualise military mobility as both the movements made but
also the discourses about and representations of those eventual
physicalities.
From a geopolitical perspective, this approach provides an
important additional lens through which to consider how states
seek to utilise their military materiel in the prosecution of their
power projection aims, requiring us to think of power projection as
being about both the specific movements of personnel andmateriel
and the underlying debates and discourses that enable them.
Furthermore, whilst existing work on military mobilities within
human geography has tended to focus on the minutiae of military
life e for example, upon how the soldier's body is trained to move
in certain environments e this paper has purposefully sought to
rescale the frame of enquiry to bring geopolitical considerations to
the fore and to enable a range of actors, organisations and tech-
nologies to be analysed. This enables an account of how military
mobilities are idealised and actualised that recognises the messy81 Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, 60.
82 See Hone, Friedman and Mendeles, Innovation in Carrier Aviation, 50.
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geographical practicalities and geopolitical desires intersect. As
such this approach enables us to consider how military forces act,
and plan to act, over long time scales and to recognise how in-
dividuals and events can influence how the casting of these mo-
bilities changes over time as policies, practices and technologies
evolve.
In conclusion, this paper has sought to bring together ideas from
geopolitical and mobilities literatures to advance the notion of
mobility as a capacity to act as a useful lens through which military
planning andmilitary technologies can be understood in relation to
the practical and performative means by and through which state
power is projected across specific spaces. A focus on military mo-
bilities requires the recognition of these sorts of intersections in
order to illuminate the unique operational spatialities of military
forces. As such, the notion of military mobilities as a capacity to actprovides a significant way to engagewith themultiplicity of factors,
actors and spatialities assembled in the preparation of forces for
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